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Antitrust—"our own, American form of nonpianning by Govern-
ment actionm—enforces a commitment to "competition [as] our
fundamental national economic policy." 2
 However, antitrust has not
traditionally been a major factor in most sectors of the American
economy subject to direct government regulations. In such industries
as communications, transportation and finance there has been little,
if any, active effort to promote competition. Instead, traditionally
there has been a tendency to protect regulated monopolists from out-
side competition, and a willingness to tolerate restrictive practices
ancillary to basic monopoly' The premise of regulation has been that
governmental supervision is a sufficient method to secure reasonable
economic performance by regulated enterprises.' In recent years,
however, the less than fully satisfactory economic performance of
* Deputy Director of Policy Planning and Chief, Evaluation Section, Antitrust Divi-
sion, United States Department of Justice. Princeton Univ., A.B., 1957; Cambridge Univ.,
B.A. Law, 1959; Harvard Univ., LL.B., 1961; Member of Massachusetts and District of
Columbia Bars.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the
position of the Antitrust Division. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of
Kenneth G. Robinson (also of the Evaluation Section, Antitrust Division) in preparing
this paper.
1 Fortas, Portents of New Anti-trust Policy, 10 Antitrust Bull. 41, 42 (1965).
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963).
a See, e.g., Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti-
trust Laws 269 (1955); Adams, Business Exemptions from the Antitrust Laws: Their
Extent and Rationale, Perspectives on Antitrust Policy 273 (Phillips ed. 1965). Adams
leaves no doubt as to his conclusion: "In industry after industry, regulatory rulemaking
and adjudication, operating within a broad delegation of discretion and reinforced by
Congressional tolerance or support, have resulted in the elimination of both actual and
potential competition." Id.
4 See, e.g., Economic Report of the President 107 (1970).
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many, if not most, of the regulated industries has given rise to criti-
cism of, and a challenge to, the premise supporting governmental
regulation.' A recurring theme in this criticism has emphasized the
reluctance of regulators to utilize competition as a means of encour-
aging economic performance, thus permitting unnecessary inefficiency
to be imposed on the economy.' The Antitrust Division has come into
this situation as an outsider with a visible commitment to competi-
tion, and significant responsibilities as an enforcer of the antitrust
laws and as an advocate for competitive policies. Its role has been
to stress the necessity for competition as a source of efficiency and in-
novation by regulated enterprises in a wide variety of circumstances
in which competition and specific regulatory goals are not incom-
patible.
I. THE ANTITRUST DIVISION
A. Organization and Responsibilities
The Antitrust Division, the largest of the ten divisions of the
Justice Department, is the executive agency responsible for antitrust
enforcement. Its professional staff, headed by an Assistant Attorney
General, consists of approximately 280 lawyers and economists
grouped in ten sections in Washington' and seven regional field offices
around the country.' It has an annual budget of about eight million
dollars---a figure considerably below that for most regulatory
agencies.'
The Division's mandate covers a variety of statutory provisions
5
 Presidential Task Force, Report on Productivity and Competition, (Stigler Report)
(Feb. 8, 1969) 115 Cong. Rec. S 6473 (daily ed. June 16, 1969). (Senator Talmadge re-
quested that this unpublished report be printed in the Record.) (5 Trade Reg. Rep.
50,250.)
0 See L. Kohlmeir, The Regulators (1969) ; Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Reg-
ulation, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 548 (1969); Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic
Regulatory Policies, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1207 (1969). This current criticism reflects part
of a continuing theme. These writers also criticize the inefficiency of overly comprehensive
and detailed regulations. They point out, among other things, that such regulation creates
two layers of management, the executives of the regulated firms and the public officers
charged with supervising them. This situation tends to produce duplication of effort and
enhances the tendency of the regulators to adopt the views of "their" industry. See also
Economic Report of the President, 107-10 (1970).
7 The sections are: Appellate, Economic, Evaluation, Foreign Commerce, General
Litigation, Judgments & Judgment Enforcement, Public Counsel, Special Litigation, Spe-
cial Trial, and Trial. Most of the Antitrust Division's activities before regulatory commis-
sions, discussed below, have been undertaken by the Public Counsel and Evaluation
sections.
8 These offices are located in New York, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Cleveland, Chicago,
San Francisco and Los Angeles. In addition, some local antitrust violations are handled
by the various United States Attorney's offices acting under the general direction of the
Antitrust Division.
9 This Division in some years returns more in fines than its cost of operation.
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designed to promote competition. It is exclusively responsible for the
enforcement of the civil and criminal provisions of the Sherman Act,'
and it shares enforcement of the Clayton Act with the Federal Trade
Commission." The great bulk of its enforcement activity is concerned
with specific anticompetitive practices such as price-fixing, group
boycotts and tying arrangements, and with mergers which produce
less competitive market structures.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act" provides the basic weapon against
anticompetitive business practices. Tempered by the hands of gener-
ations of judges and enforcers, it now covers not only such basic re-
straints as price-fixing" and market allocation," but many more
subtle restraints, including implied tie-ins" and patent licensing re-
straints." Section 1 has been supplemented by Section 3 of the
Clayton Act" which specifically prohibits tie-ins and exclusive dealing
arrangements concerning tangible goods. The greater showing of anti-
competitive injury thought to be required by the Sherman Act" has
largely been eliminated, as the Supreme Court's more recent decisions
reflect a strong tendency to assimilate the stricter Clayton Act
standards into the Sherman Act.'
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 9 (1964).
11
 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964). The use of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to.
supplement Clayton and Sherman Act civil charges is long-standing. FTC v. Motion
Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.,
384 U.S. 316 (1966); Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
12 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). Section 1 provides, in relevant part: "Every contract, com-
bination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce . . . is declared to be illegal. ."
to See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969);
United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
14 See, e.g., Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
Sr Co,, 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
15 See, e.g., Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir.
1969); Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp., 83 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1936).
1G See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
17 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964). Section 3 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . , . to lease or
make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies,
or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or
resale within the United States . . • , or fix a price charged therefor, or discount
from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition . . that the lessee or pur-
chaser ... shall not use or deal in the goods ... of a competitor. . • •
See Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 Colum L. Rev.
422, 433-36 (1965).
18 See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609-10 & n.27
(1953). See also Blake & Blum, Network Television Rate Practices: A Case Study in the
Failure of Social Control of Price Discrimination, 74 Yale L.J. 1339, 1383-85 (1965).
1D See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (tying arrangements) ;
cf. United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964) (mergers).
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The principal weapons for dealing with market power and struc-
ture are Section 2 of the Sherman Act' and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act." Section 2 is aimed at monopoly power within defined product
markets. It outlaws anticompetitive attempts to acquire such power
and probably outlaws the exercise of such power unless it is attribut-
able solely to the defendant's skill, foresight, and industry." Rela-
tively few government antitrust cases have been brought under
section 2, and it has not yet proved a conspicuously successful
antitrust tool. The same cannot be said of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act. Since it was extensively amended in 1950, it has become an
extremely effective antitrust enforcement weapon for dealing with
changes in market structures. The government has secured an almost
unbroken string of victories before the Supreme Court in merger cases
under this section.' As a result, section 7 now bars almost any sig-
nificant horizontal merger between direct competitors, 24 or vertical
mergers involving any significant market foreclosure.' It also pre-
vents conglomerate mergers involving diminution of potential com-
petition,26
 creation of dangers of reciprocity," and certain other
anticompetitive effects. 28
These few statutory tools, and the competitive policies which lie
behind them, increasingly have been applied by the Antitrust Division
in the field of regulated industries. These efforts involve direct anti-
20 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964). Section 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire . . . to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .
21 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). Section 7 provides in relevant part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or
any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
22
 Sec United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945);
Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 Ham L. Rev. 281 (1956).
23 Justice Stewart emphasized this point in his dissenting opinion in United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966).
24 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963).
25 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. Kennecott
Copper Co., 321 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 414 (1965).
26
 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
27 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa. 1963), aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
28 Ekco Products Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 .(7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Wilson
Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. III. 1968).
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trust enforcement action against regulated enterprises as well as advo-
cacy of competitive policies before the various regulatory agencies;
they appear to have produced a greater awareness of competitive
issues on the part of at least some of those charged with regulatory
responsibility.
B. The Law Enforcement Role
The Antitrust Division traditionally has brought both civil and
criminal antitrust cases against regulated enterprises. These actions
have challenged both particular anticompetitive conduct proscribed
by Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and merger transactions
proscribed by Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Some of the merger cases
have involved challenges to transactions already approved," or sub-
ject to approval," by the appropriate regulatory commission.
1. Anticompetitive Conduct
Several relatively recent antitrust cases have involved anticom-
petitive agreements among members of a regulated industry. None
of the agreements had prior approval by a regulatory agency. In 1961
and 1963 the Department brought three sets of cases against com-
mercial banks in New Jersey and Minnesota for price-fixing of bank
loans and services.81 The Minnesota cases included criminal indict-
ments. Similarly, in 1969 the Division challenged the collective action
of a group of private utilities in refusing to sell wholesale power to
municipalities or to wheel wholesale power from generating plants of
other companies to such municipalities.' This conduct, it was alleged,
constituted a group boycott and an attempt to monopolize the retail
distribution of electric power, in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. However, since none of these overtly anticompetitive
agreements had been approved by a regulatory agency, these antitrust
actions raised no direct conflict or questions of accommodation be-
tween antitrust prohibitions and the regulatory scheme.'
29 See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (involving
prior approval by the Comptroller of the Currency).
30 See California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962) (staying FPC consideration of a pipe-
line merger during the pendency of a government antitrust suit challenging it).
31 United States v. Hunterdon County Trust Co., Civ. 1100-61 (Blue Book No.
1639) (D.N.J., filed Dec. 26, 1961) ; United States v. Duluth Clearing House Ass'n.,
Cr. 5-63, Cr. 6; United States v. First Nat'l Bank, Cr. 3-63, Cr. 8; United States v.
Northwestern Nat'l Bank, Civ. 4-63, Civ. 52; United States v. First Nat'l Bank, Civ.
3-63, Civ. 37; United States v. Duluth Clearing House Ass'n Civ. 5-63, Civ. 4; (Blue
Book Nos. 1734-1739) (D. Minn., filed Feb. 8, 1963).
32 United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., Civ. No. 6-69, Civ. 139 (Blue Book
No. 2065) (D. Minn., filed July 14, 1969).
33 Cf. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963), where a private
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2. Mergers
The Antitrust Division has not always been able to avoid such
conflict. A considerable number of antitrust suits under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act and Section 1 of the Sherman Act challenging mergers
involving regulated enterprises have been brought. These cases, in-
volving commercial banks, natural gas pipelines, and broadcast in-
terests, generally represent a subsequent antitrust challenge to a
merger transaction requiring agency approval.' Additionally, in those
situations where the approving agency (typically the Interstate Com-
merce Commission) has statutory authority to immunize a merger
from antitrust challenge, the Antitrust Division may litigate the mat-
ter before the Commission and appeal adverse determinations.'
The Antitrust Division's role as a litigant has developed most
fully in the bank merger field, following the Supreme Court's land-
mark 1963 decision in the Philadelphia Nat'l Bank case." Subsequent
to this decision, Congress enacted the Bank Merger Act Amend-
ments" of 1966 as an attempt to accommodate the antitrust and
regulatory policies in the banking field, while minimizing the trou-
blesome problems of divestiture. The special rules and procedures of
this Act make provisions for subsequent antitrust challenge of agency-
approved bank. mergers," but require that the Department of Justice
file suit within 30 days," and make the antitrust action subject to a
special "convenience and needs" defense." In addition, the 1966 Act
provides for a special statutory stay to prevent consummation of the
antitrust plaintiff's charge that the New York Stock Exchange had engaged in an illegal
boycott was upheld in part on the ground that the challenged conduct was not subject
to Securities and Exchange Commission supervision under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
64 See the leading cases of United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963) (commercial banks); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651
(1964) (natural gas pipelines); United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334
(1959) (broadcast license transfer).
35 See, e.g., The Northern Line Merger Case, 396 U.S. 491 (1970), where the Anti-
trust Division was unsuccessful in blocking an ICC-approved rail merger. This same
approach has been taken by the Antitrust Division in at least one case where the regula-
tory commission did not have the authority to immunize the transaction. In the FCC's
ABC -ITT case, American Broadcasting Co., 7 F.C.C.2d 245 (1966), 9 F.C.C.2d 546
(1967), the Antitrust Division intervened before the Commission and took an appeal from
its adverse decision, rather than file a separate antitrust action. The merger was aban-
doned while the appeal was pending in the District of Columbia Circuit.
36 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
87 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
38 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (7) (Supp. IV, 1969).
89 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(C) (Supp. IV, 1969).
40 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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merger during the litigation." It also requires that the banking agen-
cies apply an antitrust competitive standard in approving bank
mergers." However this step does not seem to have influenced the
Comptroller of Currency' in producing harmonization of standards.
For example, from January, 1966 through July, 1968, the Federal
Reserve Board and the Antitrust Division advised of serious anti-
competitive effects in connection with 94 proposed mergers pending
before the Comptroller and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (of which the Comptroller is one of three directors). The
Comptroller and the FDIC issued denials in only three of these cases.
Ten others were stayed by antitrust suits filed by the Department of
Justice and all but one of these involved approvals by the Comp-
troller.
A key issue in the post-1966 bank merger litigation has been to
define the scope of the "convenience and needs" defense provided in
the 1966 Act. The statute provides that a bank merger inconsistent
with section 7 is illegal "unless . . . the anticompetitive effects of the
proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by
the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and
needs of the community to be served.' The banks and the Comp-
troller have unsuccessfully urged a very expansive reading of this
provision. On the other hand, the Antitrust Division has urged a
limited construction, in accordance with the normal treatment of anti-
trust defenses.
The latter approach has generally prevailed in the Supreme
Court. In its 1967 First City Nat'l Bank decision,' the Court empha-
sized that the non-competitive benefits must "clearly" outweigh the
loss of competition," and it placed the burden of proving the defense
on the defendant banks. The next year, in United States v. Third
Nat'l Bank,' the Court construed the statute as requiring affirmative
proof that the "merger was essential to secure this net gain to the
public interest." 48 It specifically placed on the defendant banks the
41 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (7)(A) (Supp. IV, 1969).
42 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (.5)(B) (Supp. IV, 1969).
43 The Comptroller of the Currency is responsible for all mergers in which the result-
ing institution is a national bank, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
for all mergers in which the resulting institution is a state bank member of the Federal
Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for all mergers in which
the resulting institution is a federally insured state bank outside the Federal Reserve
System.
44 12 U.S.C.	 1828(c) (5)(B) (Supp. IV, 1969).
45 United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967).
46 Id. at 370.
47 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
48 Id. at 189.
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burden of demonstrating the unavailability of measures falling short of
merger, for "[o]therwise, the benefits of competition, acknowledged
by Congress, would be sacrificed needlessly." 49 Thus the Supreme
Court has reaffirmed that the primary public need is for competitive
banking structures."
C. The Role as Advocate for Competitive Policy
In the last three years the Antitrust Division has appeared with
increasing frequency as an advocate for competitive policies in a wide
range of regulatory proceedings. This represents an extension of its
traditional role as litigant before the agencies and the appellate courts
in transportation merger cases where agency approval carried with
it an antitrust exemption. It also represents an extension of its role
as special adviser on competitive effects under the Bank Merger Act
of 1960."
The Division's role as an advocate for competition has covered
mergers, market structures, and specific anticompetitive practices in
a variety of industries, including broadcasting, communications, se-
curities, and air transportation.
1. Broadcasting
In this industry "the principle of free competition"" has long
been recognized and yet not been widely implemented by a Federal
Communications Commission seemingly concerned primarily with fi-
nancial capability as the prime determinant in broadcast licensing.'
As a result, most local media markets have been highly concentrated
in structure, with frequent cross-ownership arrangements between
local newspapers, television and radio stations, while national net-
working has been limited to three alternatives.
Beginning with the celebrated ABC-ITT case in 1967," the Anti-
trust Division has appeared frequently before the FCC urging more
competitive policies in broadcasting. ABC-ITT was in form a license
transfer proceeding under the Federal Communications Act; in fact,
40 Id.
50 See Via, Antitrust and the Amended Bank Merger and Holding Company Acts,
53 Va. L. Rev. 1115, 1131 (1967). See pp. 584-86 infra, for full discussion of the
significance of the premise in favor of competition.
51 The Act required the Department to file a report on the competitive effect of each
bank merger with the federal banking agency having jurisdiction over the merger; this
was based on the premise that the Department had some expertise in measuring competi-
tion, and the more doubtful (as it turns out) premise that such reports would reduce
policy conflicts between the Department and the regulatory agencies.
52 See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940).
53 See generally Note, Diversification in Communication: The FCC and its Failing
Standards, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 494.
54 American Broadcasting Co., 7 F.C.C.2d 245 (1966).
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it was a conglomerate acquisition by International Telephone and
Telegraph of American Broadcasting Company, the nation's third
largest network. Af ter the FCC had granted a routine approval in late
1966,' the Antitrust Division entered the proceeding and moved for
a rehearing. It urged that the elimination of ITT as a potential en-
trant into networking was significantly anticompetitive and hence war-
ranted Commission disapproval. While the Commission set the case
for evidentiary hearing, it ultimately adhered to its original position."
However, the merger was abandoned while an Antitrust Division ap-
peal was pending.
The Antitrust Division has since participated in two FCC broad-
cast licensing proceedings which raised competitive issues in local
markets. In 1968 it opposed the transfer of a Beaumont, Texas tele-
vision license to the only newspaper in the community on the grounds
that it would constitute a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.'
The transaction was subsequently abandoned and the station sold to
a newspaper operator in another city. In a more novel effort in early
1969, the Antitrust Division sought a full hearing on the license re-
newal of a monopoly television station in Cheyenne, Wyoming which
was controlled by the only newspaper in the same market." The Di-
vision's petition suggested that this local monopoly situation might
be alleviated by issuing a qualified renewal, and giving to the applicant
"a reasonable opportunity to dispose of its television station at its
market value . . . .'''" The Cheyenne case has been recently set for
hearing and is still pending before the Commission.
Similarly, where the issue of competition in local media markets
has been raised in FCC rule-making proceedings, the Antitrust Di-
vision has offered comments. In August, 1968 it supported the Com-
mission's so-called "one-to-a-market" proposal which would limit
future broadcast licensees to control of one broadcast outlet (AM,
FM, or TV) in any local market." In April, 1969 it supported a
55 American Broadcasting Co., 7 F.C.C.2d 336 (1967).
66 For a full chronology, see American Broadcasting Co., 9 F.C,C.2d 546, 699
(1967).
57 Beaumont Broadcasting Corp., FCC File No. BTC-5553 (1968). Later the
same year, the Justice Department filed a civil antitrust complaint, under Clayton Act
§ 7, against the acquisition by a local television station owner in Rockford, Illinois of
the monopoly newspaper in the same community. United States v. Gannett Co., Civ. No.
68 C 48 (Blue Book No. 2029) (N.D. Ill., filed Dec. 5, 1968). The Rockford acquisition—
unlike the Beaumont one—did not require FCC approval, since there was no change in
the control over the television station. The case was settled by consent decree requiring
divestiture of either the television station or the newspaper. 1968 Trade Cas. § 72,644
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 1969).
58 Frontier Broadcasting Co., FCC File No. BRCT-318 (1968).
60 Petition of the Dep't of Justice at 25 (Dec. 30, 1968).
66 Comments of the Dep't of Justice, FCC Dkt. 18110 (Aug. 1, 1968).
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similar FCC proposed rule which would prevent a television station
licensee from controlling a community antenna television (CATV)
system in the same market." The Commission has recently adopted
both the "one-to-a-market" rule and the CATV rule." Basically, these
rule-making filings, like the filings in specific license proceedings,
sought to apply to the broadcast licensing process the basic competitive
principles developed under Section 7 of the Clayton Act and, to a
lesser extent, under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Community antenna television is an important competitive factor
in broadcasting. The Antitrust Division has emphasized this in two
1969 filings in the FCC's wide-ranging CATV Inquiry." It noted that
CATV offers "the most promising means of achieving greater com-
petition and diversity in local mass media communications,"" and
urged the Commission "to take affirmative steps to assure that CATV
is permitted to reach its full potential as a communications media.'
It urged limitations on cross-ownership of CATV systems by major
competing local media (namely, TV stations and newspapers) in the
same market." It also opposed proposals before the Commission to
protect over-the-air broadcasters by (1) restricting distant signal im-
portation by CATV systems, (2) limiting CATV program origination,
and (3) preventing interconnection of CATV systems. It stressed that
such proposals would severely limit the effectiveness of CATV as a
new entrant in mass media communications." At the same time, the
Antitrust Division noted that a local CATV system generally is a
monopoly and would have to provide equitable access to its cable for
independent sources of programming, in accordance with established
antitrust principles.
2. Common Carrier Communications
The broad competitive issue in this field has been how to confine
a natural monopoly to its necessary bounds. The telephone companies
have long used their control over the telephone network as a means
of discouraging customer-owned communications equipment, and con-
61 FCC Dkt. 18397 (1968).
42 Multiple Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, FCC Dkt. 18110, — P&F Radio
Reg. 2cl — (1970); Second Report and Order, FCC Dkt. 18397, — P&F Radio Reg. —
(1970).
63 FCC Dkt. 18397 (1968).
64 Comments of the Dep't of justice, FCC Dkt. 18397, at 16 (April 7, 1969).
05 Id. at 10.
66 Id. at 15-26.
67 Comments of Dep't of Justice, FCC Dkt. 18397 (Sept. 5, 1969).
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trolling such ancillary items as dial advertising discs" and telephone
directory covers."
The Antitrust Division entered this field in 1967 with an amicus
brief, supporting the FCC staff, in the Commission's Carterfone" pro-
ceeding. This proceeding questioned the telephone companies' strict
"foreign attachment" tariffs which prevented use of most customer-
supplied communications equipment. The Division claimed that such
a blanket prohibition was unnecessarily restrictive, since the telephone
network could be protected from harm by less restrictive measures,
and the prohibition therefore constituted an "unwarranted interfer-
ence with the telephone subscriber's right reasonably to use his tele-
phone in ways which are privately beneficial without being publicly
detrimental." 71
 The Commission struck this tariff down in June,
1968,72
 and since then the Antitrust Division has actively participated
in the Commission's attempts to formulate a new liberal tariff."
The Antitrust Division also made a comprehensive filing in early
1967 in the FCC's broad-ranging Computer Inquiry. 74 This dealt both
with restrictive communications carrier practices (such as the "for-
eign attachment" rule), and the various competitive problems posed
by carrier entry into the data processing field.
The Antitrust Division has challenged restrictive telephone com-
pany practices in the CATV field. In a 1969 brief to the FCC, the
Division urged that serious antitrust questions were raised by the
telephone company practice of unnecessarily restricting CATV op-
erators' access to telephone company poles and underground conduits,
and the related practice of insisting that CATV operators offer no
communications services other than CATV." After the Bell System
had announced that it would abandon these practices, the Commis-
sion issued an opinion declaring them illegal."
08 Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Dialite Dial Co., 102 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Okla.
1951), appeal dismissed, 197 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1952).
66 Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Miner, 11 III. App. 2d 44, 136 N.E.2d 1 (1956).
70 Carterfone Device, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).
71 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae (Oct. 13, 1967), quoting Hush-a-
Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
72 Carterfone Device, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).
73
 See AT&T Tariff Revisions, 15 F.C.C.2d 605 (1968).
74 Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Communication Services and Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11 (1966); see Response of the
Dep't of Justice, March 5, 1968.
75 Comments of the Dep't of Justice, FCC Dkt. 18509, (July 11, 1969).
76 Letter from AT&T to FCC Chairman Hyde (Oct. 28, 1969); Final Report and
Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 307 (1970), modified, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 P&F
Radio Reg. 2d 1799 (1970).
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3. Securities
The broad problem in this area is that the nation's dominant se-
curities market, the New York Stock Exchange, has long operated
with little regard for competitive policies. It has operated on the basis
of a system of collectively fixed rates, with various rules discriminat-
ing against non-members. While the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion enjoys general supervision over the industry, the basic scheme
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is "self-regulation." The
SEC has rarely exercised its formal powers to supervise exchange
membership, procedures and rules under Section 19(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act.'
Antitrust involvement in this field began in 1963 with a private
antitrust case, Silver v. New York Stock Exch. :78
 in which the Solicitor
General filed an amicus curiae brief arguing successfully against
a general antitrust exemption for securities exchanges. The Supreme
Court generally sustained this position in a decision which held that,
"repeal [of the antitrust laws] is to be regarded as implied only if
necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then
only to the minimum extent necessary." 79
In April, 1968 the Antitrust Division questioned under the
Silver standard the basic scheme of rate-fixing practiced by the New
York Stock Exchange. This came in the form of a comment filed with
the SEC in a pending proceeding on reciprocity and related practices
in which the Division's basic point of argument was that the wide-
spread reciprocal practices were the product of an artificial pricing
system. This led to a general SEC investigation of commission rates.
The Antitrust Division offered testimony of several leading economists
covering a range of competitive issues. In January, 1969 the Division
filed a comprehensive memorandum recommending the elimination of
most fixed rates on the grounds that they are not "necessary to make
the Exchange Act work," as required by Silver, and recommended
that changes be made in various rules which discriminate against
non-members. The rate proceeding is still pending.
A third brief was filed by the Division in late 1969 criticizing
the Exchange's proposals to relax the existing restrictions on public
ownership of member firms. The main thrust of the criticism is that
77
 The only example of the direct Commission action under § 19(b) involved an
attempt by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to undermine the regional stock
exchanges by preventing NYSE members from trading NYSE-listed securities on the re-
gional exchanges. The Commission struck down the rule in the Multiple Trading case,
noting that "at best" it was an attempt to implement NYSE's own rate-fixing arrange-
ment. Rules of the New York Stock Exch., 10 S.E.C. 270, 290 (1941).
78 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
79 Id. at 357.
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the proposals do not go far enough as "they do not represent a general
opening of NYSE membership to those who can meet the objective
criteria of honesty, solvency, and professional skill."'
The foregoing examples by no means exhaustively cover the
Antitrust Division's increasing role as advocate for competitive pol-
icies. In 1969 alone, the Division filed two briefs with the Civil Aero-
nautics Board opposing, on antitrust grounds, two air carrier agree-
ments which would have eliminated competition in non-carrier fields.
The first brief involves reservation systems" and the other involves
the travel agency business." It also participated during 1969 in two
Federal Power Commission proceedings involving a pipeline joint
ventures' and the competitive procurement practices for regulated
utilities." None of these issues has yet been acted on.
For the past few years the Antitrust Division has conducted a
fairly intensive effort to promote greater acceptance of competition in
regulated industries. It has gone beyond its traditional role as a party
in adversary litigation, and become involved in general investigations,
rule-making proceedings and industry inquiries. This effort has been
generally recommended. The 1968 Neal Report s' commented:
In the regulated sector of the economy, the bias of policy
and its enforcement is overwhelmingly against competition.
This bias manifests itself in more permissive policies toward
8° Comments of the Dep't of Justice (Nov. 17, 1969) in response to SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8717 (Oct. 8, 1969). For a record of the Division's initial
actions in this proceeding, see Comments of the Dep't of Justice (April, 1968) in re-
sponse to SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968); Memorandum
of Dep't of Justice on the Fixed Minimum Commission Rate Structure (Jan. 17, 1969).
81 The challenged arrangement would have required all air carriers to use a common
reservation system; it would thus have eliminated any meaningful competition to the
computer service company proposing the system. See Comments of Dep't of Justice,
CAB Dkt. 20929 (May 28, 1969) (Aug. 21, 1969) (Jan. 20, 1970) (Feb. 11, 1970).
82 The challenged arrangement would have required all air carriers to cease dealing
with certain travel agents—mostly smaller ones—and would thereby have restricted
competition in this field. See Comments of Dep't of Justice, CAB Dkt. 21305 (Sept.
12, 1969).
82 Great Lakes Gas Transmission Co., FPC Dkts. CP66-110 (1969). This was a
remand proceeding following the court of appeals decision that the Commission had
failed to give adequate weight to competition in originally approving the scheme.
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Antitrust Divi-
sion attorneys participated in evidentiary hearings and submitted briefs covering both
the competitive effects of the transaction and the alleged countervailing benefits. See
Reply of Dep't of Justice to Initial Brief and Motion of Michigan Wisconsin Pipeline
Gas Co. and Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. (Dec. 5, 1969).
84 The Division offered a brief and an oral argument supporting a Commission pro-
posal to require some form of competitive procurement noted by pipeline companies and
electric utilities subject to its jurisdiction.
85 Presidential Task Force, Report on Antitrust Policy (Neal Report) (July 5,
1968).
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mergers and exemption of mergers from antitrust stan-
dards .... We believe that this bias is contrary to the public
interest . . . [and] recommend further study of regulated
industries to determine the extent to which competition and
the competitive standards of the antitrust laws can be sub-
stituted for at least some aspects of regulation.86
The 1969 Stigler Report urged even greater activity by the Anti-
trust Division and recommended a formalization of its role as "the
effective agent of the Administration in behalf of a policy of compe-
tition." It went on to emphasize that
the regulatory commissions are largely out of control. .. .
The economic triviality and irrelevance of much activity of
the regulatory commissions is patent and inexcusable. .. .
The commissions should have the merits of competition
pressed upon them. Competition is not a matter of all or
none, and the fact of regulation should not exclude competi-
tion . . . 87
The Antitrust Division's role as an advocate of competition is
significant, and yet the existence of the role does not answer the ques-
tion of how the interest of competition is to be balanced with other
regulatory goals, before either the agencies or the courts.
II. THE SEARCH FOR A UNIFYING STANDARD
A. The Relationship Between Competition and Regulation
The decision to impose direct regulation on particular industries
generally rests with Congress and it has based its decisions to regulate
on a variety of economic, social and political considerations." Typi-
cally, a government agency is given broad responsibility for a partic-
ular industry, and is charged, under the quite open-ended mandate of
insuring that its industry's activities meet the "public interest," with
evaluating and regulating such activities. In making its evaluation a
wide variety of factors come into consideration. Competition is one
such factor.
Direct regulation of course tends to eliminate competition to the
extent that it imposes limitations on entry, pricing, and other com-
mercial practices. Yet competition and regulation do not necessarily
serve inconsistent goals. This point was recently emphasized by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia:
86 Id. at VII-4, VII-5.
87 Presidential Task Force, Report on Productivity and Competition (Stigler Re-
port) (Feb. 8, 1969) (5 Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 50,250, at 55516).
88 See generally C. Phillips, The Economics of Regulation 19 (1955).
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Despite a continuing debate, it appears that the basic goal of
direct governmental regulation through administrative bodies
and the goal of indirect governmental regulation in the form
of antitrust law is the same—to achieve the most efficient
allocation of resources possible. For instance, whether a
regulatory body is dictating the selling price or that price is
determined by a market free from unreasonable restraints of
trade, the desired result is to establish a selling price which
covers costs plus a reasonable rate of return on capital,
thereby avoiding monopoly profits."
The decision to impose direct regulation has been made in two
basic types of situations where competition was not fully satisfactory.
The first involves a natural monopoly where competition simply is not
economically possible such as the local telephone network. The econ-
omies of scale are so great that direct competition would be "a
costly and idle gesture."N There, economic policy is the controlling
consideration in the decision to regulate.' Regulation is necessary to
secure the classic marketplace goals of efficiency and innovation. How-
ever, the courts have held that the regulatory scheme does not require
maintenance of an absolute telephone company monopoly over all
ancillary equipment, directories, and so forth.'
The second type of situation is where competition does not secure
Some specifically defined social goal. This is the basis for regulating
both banks and securities markets. The solvency of banks is accepted
as an overriding social goal, because the principle losses from bank
failures fall on innocent depositors. Similarly, the issuance and trading
of. securities is regulated to insure full disclosure and fairness to the
investing public, and continued confidence in the capital market. Regu-
latory supervision is directed to these specific goals. Neither scheme
implies a general elimination of competition. The Supreme Court made
this clear in its Third Nat'l Bank''' and Silver" decisions; antitrust
is only excluded to the extent necessary to make the specific regula-
tory scheme work.
On the other hand, where regulation is used as a means of offering
protection from competition to those already subject to regulation it
89 Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
99 Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 Harv.
L. Rev. 1207, 1208 (1969).
91 See C. Kaysen D.F. Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analy-
sis, 189-90 (1959).
92 See Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
Carterfone Device, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968); and discussion, pp. 580-81 supra.
93 United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
94 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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generally seems less justifiable. The two clearest examples are in the
motor carrier and CATV fields. Both industries marked a new com-
petitive challenge to existing interests—in one case the railroads and
in the other the over-the-air broadcasters. This led Congress, with
ICC support, to impose direct rate and entry regulation over the motor
carriers," and led the FCC, even without such a clear mandate, to
regulate CATV programming (but not entry)."
Competitive and regulatory policies can come into contact in sev-
eral situations. The regulatory agency often determines whether new
entrants will be allowed to enter the field, or it is charged with respon-
sibility for licensing those who apply for entry. The agencies also
become involved with questions of acquisitions by and mergers of
industries under their control. Agency and antitrust policies may also
meet when the regulator is asked to authorize or approve specific
restrictive practices. When a question before a regulatory agency
touches both the agency's policies and competitive questions, the
courts have made clear that competition is a basic element which must
be considered.
This point was recently re-emphasized in the important 1968
Supreme Court decision of Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktie-
bolaget Svenska Amerika Linien." This decision made clear that
serious anticompetitive effects "alone will normally constitute sub-
stantial evidence that the [proposal before the Commission] is 'con-
trary to the public interest,' unless other evidence in the record fairly
detracts from the weight of this factor."" On this basis the Court up-
held the Commission's rule requiring the proponent of an anticom-
petitive proposal to "demonstrate that . .. [it] was required by a
serious transportation need, necessary to secure important public
benefits or in furtherance of a valid regulatory purpose . . . .'"
The Supreme Court had made a broadly similar point ten years
earlier in United States v. Radio Corp. of America,' where it held
that the FCC must consider antitrust principles in applying the public
interest test of the Communications Act:
Moreover, in a given case the Commission might find that
antitrust considerations alone would keep the statutory stan-
dard from being met, as when the publisher of the sole news-
paper in an area applies for a license for the only available
radio and television facilities, which, if granted, would give
95 See, e.g., Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I.C.C. 263 (1932).
96 See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
97
 390 U.S. 238 (1968).
98 Id. at 246.
96 Id. at 243.
10° 358 U.S. 333 (1959).
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him a monopoly of that area's major media of mass commu-
nications.'"
Another particularly useful discussion of the significance of competi-
tive considerations may be found in Northern Natural Gas Co. v.
FPC, a recent court of appeals decision dealing with a pipeline merger.
The court stated:
Although the [Federal Power] Commission is not bound by
the dictates of the antitrust laws, it is clear that antitrust
concepts are intimately involved in a determination of what
action is in the public interest, and therefore the commission
is obliged to weigh antitrust policy.'
B. The Regulator's Problem—An Unstructured Inquiry
These decisions make clear that the regulator is required to con-
sider competition as a basic element in any "public interest" deter-
mination. Yet they leave unanswered a crucial question—how is the
regulator to apply competitive policy in a clear, consistent manner?
Competitive issues do not generally arise in isolated abstraction, but
rather as part of intensely practical proceedings to determine who
shall be permitted to enter or merge, or what those in the industry
shall be permitted to do. Such proceedings can, and of ten do, involve
many complex technical questions such as, in the communications
field, "spectrum conservation" or "network integrity." They also can
involve economic questions of equal complexity, such as "cross
subsidy," at least where the agency must deal with pricing and service
offerings. Most of these questions cannot be resolved with mathe-
matical precision, which is one reason why regulatory proceedings can
be both long and indecisive from the evidentiary standpoint. Yet it is
in the context of such complex proceedings that the regulator must
often face crucial questions of competitive policy.
When the question of allowing more competition is in issue, those
regulated can usually be counted on to present an extensive case
in opposition. Monopolists, including those which are regulated, rarely
welcome intrusions from the marketplace. They will press the regu-
lator with "technical" arguments and ominous predictions that new
competition will seriously impair, or even destroy, the regulatory
scheme. The regulator will be strongly urged to use his "so-called 'ex-
pertise' " 1" to resolve specific issues in favor of non-competitive solu-
tions.
101 Id. at 351-52 (dictum).
102 Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
103 See Judge Frank's dissenting opinions in Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d
939, 946 (2d Cir. 1951); Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 161
F.2d 413, 450-51 (2d Cir. 1947).
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The basic problem arises from the lack of a clear method of in-
quiry, which presently tends to be open-ended in scope and lacking
in pre-assigned weights for individual factors. Even a relatively simple
case can become complex and unpredictable in such circumstances.
The President's Council of Economic Advisers has emphasized this
point in its recent annual report:
The fundamental problem Iles in the complex and con-
flicting objectives that sometimes characterize economic reg-
ulation itself. Agencies are supposed to protect the present
and future interests of consumers, employees, investors, and
the Government. No one can begin to see the full conse-
quences of current decisions on all these groups. As quasi-
judicial bodies, the regulatory commissions tend to give much
weight to precedent. As a result, change of any kind becomes
hard to justify and even harder to allow when some affected
group can claim immediate harm, whereas the potential
beneficiaries are widely diffused and usually not represented.
Yet innovation and adaptation are the dynamics of economic
progress.
There is no clear safeguard against these dangers, but
reliance on economic incentives and market mechanisms in
regulated industries would be a step forward.'"
The current regulatory problem can be illustrated by trying to
imagine how the famous Charles River Bridge easel" would be de-
cided by a regulatory agency today. The underlying issue would still
be, as it was in the Supreme Court's 1837 decision, a competitive chal-
lenge to a monopoly toll bridge. But the arguments would be much
more varied and complex. The Supreme Court only had to concern
itself with the legal question whether the "Charles River Bridge"
charter gave it an implied monopoly grant,'" and hence protected it
against erection of a parallel competitive span. The Court of course
rejected this argument, stating that the rights of private property are
to be "sacredly guarded," but the public interest must control.'" Any
104 Economic Report of the President 108 (1970).
105 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
Ion A modern version of this argument is COMSAT's assertion that the 1962 Satellite
Act implicitly gave it the exclusive right to offer domestic satellite service. See COMSAT
Brief at 7-8, 12-13 and Supplemental Brief at 17, 19 in Domestic Satellite Inquiry,
2 F.C.C.2d 668 (1966). The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has argued in a similar
vein that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 implicitly "mandated" a system of non-
competitive minimum commission rates. See NYSE Legal Brief at H 2, 3, 7, 12, 14
(August, 1968), Commission Rate Structure of National Securities Exchanges, SEC File
No. 40144 (1968) [hereinafter cited as SEC Commission Rote Proceeding].
107 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 547.
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other construction, it added, would enable the holders of "old feudal
grants" to prevent the growth of new methods of transportation. 1"
Today this case would probably arise before an independent com-
mission charged with statutory responsibility for regulating private
toll bridges, canals, and steamboats so as to serve the "public interest,
convenience and necessity." The applicant for a competing span would
present the commission with a proposal supported by detailed traffic
estimates and projections, evidence of its financial and engineering
capability, and a legal brief emphasizing the advantages of competi-
tion. The "Charles River Bridge" company would meet this challenge
to its long standing monopoly with vast numbers of lawyers, engineers,
accountants, and economists armed with a battery of statistics, per-
formance tables, regression analyses, and a fine reputation for reason-
able performance under the commission's continuous surveillance. Its
arguments would be many and its evidence voluminous. Under the
heading "economic policy," it would argue that the new service was not
needed,'" that it would threaten to produce "destructive pricing" 110
and "cream-skimming, 71 '1
 while denying the public the benefit of
"economies of scale" which could be achieved with a single bridge.
Its "technical" arguments would stress the need for unified "system
planning,""3
 the lower technical standards of the competing appli-
cant' and the risk that the competition would promote corner-cutting
on maintenance and safety requirements. 115
 Finally, there would be a
variety of "public interest" or "convenience and needs" arguments,
dredged up from old cases. Thus, it would be argued that a second
108 Id. at 553; cf. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 127 (1877).
109
 See, e.g., the arguments of AT&T and other carriers in the Microwave
Communications, Inc., 16 P&F Radio Reg. 2d 1037 (FCC 1969) [hereinafter cited as
MCI]; and Carterfone Device, 5 F.C.C.2d 360 (1966), 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).
110
 See New York Stock Exchange Economic Brief, SEC Commission Rate Pro-
ceedings, SEC File No. 40144 (1968). Note also the ICC's position that they must reg-
ulate the motor carriers in order to eliminate "destructive competition between truckers."
Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I.C.C. 263, 362 (1932).
111
 See, e.g., AT&T's arguments in MCI, 16 P&F Radio Reg. 2d 1057 (FCC 1969).
Allocations of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359, 367-68 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Above 890 Mc.).
112 "Bell's watchword has been 'one system, one policy, universal service' . . ."
Investigation of the Telephone Industry in the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 340, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 145-46 (1939).
113
 See AT&T's argument in Carterfone Device, 5 F.C.C.2d 360 (1966), 13 F.C.C.2d
420 (1968), that "[Interconnection] would inevitably result in degradation of service."
Brief and Proposed Findings and Conclusions of Bell System Parties at 20.
114
 See AT&T's arguments in MCI, 16 P&F Radio Reg. 2d 1037 (FCC 1969).
115
 Cf. the New York Stock Exchange's arguments on the effect of reduced corn-
missions on industry standards in the SEC Commission Rate Proceedings, SEC File No.
40144, at 20-24 (1968).
589
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
bridge would adversely affect the scenic beauty of the river basin, 116
would complicate navigation and impede the fish. 117
This modern version of the Charles River Bridge case makes clear
that even a relatively simple case can become a morass. How is a dil-
igent regulator to weigh this assortment of arguments involving so
many considerations which cannot be readily measured or quantified?
How can he do this in a rational manner which gives businessmen and
lawyers reasonable guidance for the future? It has been suggested that
an individual's capacity for making a sound judgment about a complex
situation may be seriously impaired by supplying him with much
information which he believes should be relevant but the influence of
which on the situation is not clear."' This makes it very difficult to
formulate any decision having both a rational basis and meaningful
precedential value. Thus, even the same agency has handled basically
analogous situations in contrary ways. For example, the FCC's de-
cisions allowing microwave competition with domestic communications
common carriers have been libera1, 1 " while its decisions on satellite
competition with international carriers have been highly protectionist.'
Similarly, the SEC has been liberal in allowing competition with the
New York Stock Exchange by regional exchanges in NYSE-listed
securities,' but reluctant to allow such competition by over-the-
counter dealers."'
Such open-ended inquiry can produce extensive delay—especially
when combined with staff shortages or excessive caution—and as such
can easily forestall potentially beneficial private activity, or even stop
it altogether."" A mandate requiring that all innovations, however
desirable, should be delayed in order to make sure that each particular
116 Cf. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
117 Cf. Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
118 Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics,
74 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 295 & n.22 (1960) ; cf. the discussions of the legal and practical
objections to favorable consideration of post-acquisition evidence in the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision, 358 F.2d 74, 82-83 (1966), and the Supreme Court's decision
in the Procter & Gamble and Clorox Bleach merger case, FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S. 568, 587 (1966) (concurring opinion of Harlan, J.).
119 See, e.g., MCI, 16 P&F Radio Reg. 2d 1037 (FCC 1969); Above 890 Mc,
277 F.C.C. 359 (1959).
120 See, e.g., Authorized Entities & Authorized Users Under the Communications
Satellite Act of 1962, 4 F.C.C.2d 421 (1966).
121 Rules of the New York Stock Exch., 10 S.E.C. 270 (1941).
122 See Schapiro, Exhibit 1, in the SEC Commission Rate Proceedings, SEC File No.
40144 (1968).
122 See Prettyman, Reducing the Delay in Administrative Hearings: Suggestions for
Officers and Counsel, 39 A.B.A.J. 966 (1953), where Judge Prettyman expressed his feel-
ings that "the inexplicable delays and expense we hear about [are not] due to the incom-
petence of counsel [or] to lack of craftsmanship in trial [but to] the wily lawyer with
a weak case ... who creates all possible confusion so as to delay to the bitter utmost the
inevitable bad tidings." Id. at 970.
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innovation is desirable should be avoided if possible."' Thus, the na-
ture of the problem is clear. Now, as in 1837, we have the same basic
public interest in competition as a source of innovation, efficiency, and
low toll rates, but today we have no method of objectively weighing
these advantages against the contrary arguments favoring regulation.
C. A Suggested Resolution
A clearer method of decision-making can be devised, where
competition and so-called "regulatory" goals come into conflict. To
accomplish this, there must first be clear recognition by the regulators
and the courts that competition is a basic national economic policy,
and the cornerstone of national economic strength.' Secondly, the
basic regulatory goals in the industry involved must be clearly defined.
Having defined its goals and recognized competition as a basic policy,
the regulator should then place on the proponent of a non-competitive
solution the burden of showing that, it is necessary to achieve the
regulatory goals so defined. This was precisely the basis for the Su-
preme Court decision in Silver: antitrust, and hence competition, were
to be displaced only to the extent necessary to make the specific regu-
latory scheme of the Securities Exchange Act work.120
 Similarly, re-
garding bank mergers, the Supreme Court has made clear that the
burden of proving the "convenience and needs" justification for an
anticompetitive bank merger rests on the merging banks. They must
prove not only that there is a non-competitive objective which should
be assigned controlling weight, but that this goal could not be achieved
by a less anticompetitive arrangement."'
It is important that the burden of showing necessity be placed on
those who oppose competition, regardless of whether the question is
raised by opposition to a new entry, a request for permission to merge,
or a quest to institute a particular restrictive practice. The regulated
enterprise has the incentive and resources necessary to raise non-corn-
124
 Sec H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in Making and
Application of Law 875 (tent. ed. 1958). See also President Nixon's Memorandum to FCC
Chairman Dean Burch, Domestic Satellite Inquiry, FCC Dkt. 16495 (Jan. 1970).
125 The Council of Economic Advisers' recent annual report which urges "more reli-
ance on economic incentives and market mechanisms in regulated industries" specifically
applies this point to regulated industries. Such "industries have been more progressive
when the agencies have endeavored to confine regulation to a necessary minimum and
have otherwise fostered competition. When regulation has stifled competition, performance
has deteriorated. The clearest lesson of all, however, is that regulation should be narrowed
or halted when it has outlived its original purpose." Economic Report of the President
108 (1970).
128 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
127
 United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 366 (1967) (on general
burden of proof); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 190 (1968) (on
the requirement of least anticompetitive solution).
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petitive values. It has detailed information of the operation of the par-
ticular system, be it the telephone network, the stock exchange, or a
bank. To place the burden on the outside party is, in fact, to ask
him to rebut a technical argument not yet made."' As the FCC
Carterfonel" and MCP" cases show, this approach necessitates dili-
gent investigation and, even in Carterfone and MCI, the competitive
solution might not have prevailed absent the active and imaginative
role played by the FCC Common Carrier Bureau.
Any such method of resolving the "competitive" and "regulatory"
goals will require regulatory performance of a high order, since the
regulator will have to bear the burden of determining what economic
activities are necessary. This will no doubt require both technical
competence and administrative courage. The present non-method of
inquiry has not been particularly successful. In many regulated indus-
tries, including motor carriers' and air transport,' it has been ar-
gued that progress has come not from direct regulation, but in spite of
it.133 Moreover, as noted above, competition and regulation are not
polar extremes; competition should be affirmatively encouraged so
long as it is not inconsistent with the basic regulatory scheme. Com-
petitive alternatives offer the significant advantages to the regulator
of simplified regulation, better performance, and the greater public
confidence which flows from impersonal decision making by the mar-
ketplace.
CONCLUSION
The Antitrust Division has played a growing role, both as law
enforcer and advocate, in industries covered by some form of govern-
mental regulation. This has been paralleled by increasing recognition
on the part of the courts that competitive policies can and should be
applied as part of a regulatory scheme.'" Thus, in Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank the Supreme Court stated:
The fact that banking is a highly regulated industry critical
128 See ICC v. J-T Transp. Co., 368 U.S. 81, 86-87, 90 (1961); Dep't. of
Justice Petition for Reconsideration of AT&T Tariff, 15 F.C.C. 2d 605 (1968), filed
Jan. 23, 1969.
128 5 F.C.C.2d 360 (1966), 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).
138 16 P&F Radio Reg. 2d 1037 (FCC 1969).
131 See Comment, National Transportation Policy and the Regulation of Motor Car-
riers, 71 Yale L. J. 307 (1961).
132 See Comment, Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation and Na-
tional Regulation Policy, 74 Yale L.J. 1416 (1965).
133 Adams, Business Exemption From the Antitrust Laws: Their Extent and Ra-
tional Regulation Policy, 74 Yale L.J. 1416 (1965).
134 See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Federal
Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238 (1968); North-
ern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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to the Nation's welfare makes the play of competition not
less important but more so. . . [U]nless competition is al-
lowed to fulfill its role as an economic regulator in the
banking industry, the result may well be even more govern-
mental regulation. Subject to narrow qualifications, it is
surely the case that competition is our fundamental national
economic policy, offering as it does the only alternative to
the cartelization or governmental regimentation of large
portions of the economy.'"
The often controversial efforts of the Antitrust Division have em-
phasized this message in the regulatory arena. The Division's filings
with regulatory agencies have been pragmatic documents dealing with
competitive policy issues in the context of particular industry situa-
tions. They have reflected a healthy skepticism toward arguments for
abandoning all competition to serve some other allegedly necessary
goal. This has enabled the Division to play a distinctive role as an
advocate for a national economic policy, not some particular vested
interest.
The ultimate success of this effort will depend largely on the
agencies themselves—in particular on their willingness to enforce com-
petitive policies on their own motion, and on their ability to develop a
meaningful method for balancing competition against other policies.
If the agencies instead "leave competition to Justice," then the influ-
ence of a competitive voice will continue to be limited to the most
serious cases, simply because the Antitrust Division lacks the resources
to do more. In such circumstances the only alternatives available
would be to increase substantially the Antitrust Division's enforce-
ment capability, or to create some new substantial agency with such
capability and interest, or to make extensive changes in the structure,
proceedures and standards under which regulatory agencies operate.
135 374 U.S. at 372.
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